Summary
Craig J. Venter was
the first to create a lifeform sheerly out of biological data; he created a
bacterial cell based off of viral DNA that was able to move, eat, and
replicate. This was in 2010, but synthetic biology where life is created or
modified is not new. It has played a role throughout history and continues to
change the daily lives of people on Earth. In Biology’s
Brave New World, Laurie Garrett tells Venter’s story as well as those of
other advances and uses of synthetic biology and biotechnology. She displays
the many dangers of it through the story of H5N1, a synthetically advanced
influenza virus that quickly got out of hand. Focusing on political lack of
preparation, miscommunication, and WHO’s inability to respond effectively to
the situation, she argues that while innovation using synthetic biology is
promising and could be used for the greater good, there are a lot of systematic
changes that need to be addressed first. Otherwise, unintentional or overlooked
problems could be deadly.
Analysis & Synthesis
The first time I can
remember encountering synthetic biology was with a research project in 7th
grade. I chose animal testing as my topic and ran into an article about the
first successfully cloned sheep, Dolly. The article shared the scientists
opinions in veneration of cloning as a useful technology to understand more
about DNA as well as to allow for more controlled and reliable testing. The
author also added data on mutations and deformities that often occur in
cloning, as well as how expensive it is.
I was intrigued by
how contradictory the innovation and its uses were; clones would reduce the
need for gathering or breeding more animals from the wild for the cruelty of
testing, but also create life solely for the purpose of cruelty and killing.
After reading Biology’s Brave New World
I feel no less torn, and I am afraid it will come down to a ‘lesser of two
evils’ situation, due to our inability to reform the political systems that
would regulate and control biological innovation. Humanity needs to be able to
regulate and control these innovations because they would intrinsically “have a
life of their own” (31).
There are many
reasons within the string of cause and effect that made H5N1 a danger, which
each exemplify the World’s incapability on different levels. When WHO learned
of H5N1’s evolution to something dangerous in U.S. labs, they discovered it had
been altered the same way in places around the world. The disease originally
only passed on by direct contact with birds, with a 69% fatality rate, was
altered into "a form of H5N1 that could spread through the air from one
mammal to another" (32). Here is the first example of a major problem: a
lack of documentation and communication from innovators and laboratories around
the world. WHO wasn’t informed by other countries that they had made the virus
deadly until labs in the United States informed them. How could WHO possibly
make the right arrangements to control possible outbreak if they don’t even
know where the virus is at any given point, or how much of it is being
created?
The second major
problem occurred when the virus was released from a laboratory in Egypt. A
building in Cairo was broken into and destroyed as part of a political
rebellion and the vials of the deadly virus went missing. Here is a major lack
of necessary security for something that could be devastating for the human
race, as well as a lack of communication. I’m sure whoever had the vials didn’t
know what they were or what they could have possibly unleashed unto themselves
and the rest of the world. The government would need to supply ample evidence
and information to the public so in this kind of a situation citizens would be
able to recognize something deadly and its implications. Of course, this kind
of information being available would cause a new myriad of problems, such as
information being taken and used by bioterrorists or for other biowarfare, as
well as controlling public feedback and possibly panic at the knowledge that
these dangerous things exist and their circumstances (whose hands their in,
their use, etc.).
If WHO and the
political systems they interact with were able to adapt to solve a world
problem flawlessly, wouldn’t we have systematically ended world hunger, wiped
out other diseases, have less fear and uncertainty about the current Ebola
spread? Biotechnology has a lot to offer, but synthetic biological innovations
aren’t something humanity can afford any error on in terms of control and
emergency response. I believe it is impossible for the global political system
to adapt to be able to effectively and efficiently respond to possible problems
as seen with H5N1; there will not be an “okay, you can start now” moment for
implementing biotechnology. In the end, if synthetic biology is to be
officially implemented, it will be on a case by case basis, where the possible
or necessary benefits to humanity outweigh the risks. For example, if it is to
create a bacteria or virus that would allow us to defeat something already
wiping humanity out.
The problem and
scary part is, there currently isn’t anything official preventing scientists
from creating something deadly. The genetic engineering of existing life and
the creation of new lifeforms is seen "as the cutting edge of the field.”
(37) Those involved vary in background and experience, and “whether they are
competing in science fairs or carrying out experiments, they have little time
for debates surrounding dual-use research; they are simply plowing ahead"
(37). Younger generations are getting involved on a recreational and casual
level, starting with competitions held by MIT started in 2004 asking college
and high school students to create new life forms. Machines are available that
allow anyone to sequence a genome at home in less than 24 hours; companies can
be hired to do the same. There remains no information security. Genetic codes
can be hidden in videos, tweets, posts, anything, directing the viewer to a
place online with the code that just needs to be put in a printer or DNA
sequence. I feel the only way for politics and our social structure to be able
to handle these innovations with a life of their own is to somehow give
ourselves this same adapting, aggressive life of our own.
